Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 1 | Issue 2

Article 2

1910

Insanity as a Defense to Crime with Especial
Reference to the Thaw Case
Frederick W. Griffin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Frederick W. Griffin, Insanity as a Defense to Crime with Especial Reference to the Thaw Case, 1 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology
179 (May 1910 to March 1911)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME: WITH ESPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE THAW CASE.
FREDERICK W.

GIFFIN.

1

The notorious Thaw case has now, for upward of two years,
abused the public ear, outraged the public decency and cost thousands upon thousands out of the public funds. It has grown excessively fatiguing and, certainly, any attempts to revive a flagging
interest in it ought to be visited with general disapproval. But we
are assured, and rightly assured, by Judge Pryor in the public
prints, that there is, to borrow the phrase of the weather bureau,
"No relief in sight"; since Thaw, at any time he may see fit, can
renew his application for freedom and rehearse the whole tedious
detail over again, repeating his attempt until he is successful or
death comes to his or our relief. This being so, he will, perhaps,
succeed, for the people's patience will break down finally under insistent clamor; and that will be yielded to importunity which to
justice has been denied. In this posture of affairs, a well-meant
effort to chase away this nightmare-to suggest such changes in
our practice and our laws as will save us from the same interminable consequences in future similar cases-ought to be considered
as standing on a different footing from that on which rests a proposal to rehash the case itself and should be entitled to a more respectful reception.
In almost every jurisdiction, the law relating to insanity as
a defense to crime will be found, I believe, to be in a more or less
confused condition; in general, not susceptible of being expressed
in terms of scientific precision, and losing itself, at critical points,
in meaningless or vague phrases. The principal causes of this unsatisfactory state of the law can be, I think, briefly indicated.
I.
Our first inquiry is, by what right does society deal with
crime at all? It cannot be denied, I presume, that, as a matter of
historical fact, every system of punishment, every code of pains
and penalties, has been produced by two agencies, to a certain extent irreconcilable with each other. The first is the sense of the
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necessity which exists (and is felt by every society to exist), for
the punishment of certain kinds of human action-varying of
course with varying conditions. This is the reason, and, as I shall
herein claim, the only reason why society has the right to punish
crime. IBut though the only reason for the right, it is not by any
manner of means the reason which solely explains every penal code
that has ever existed among men. Another cause there actually is,
and this is the desire, or the passion of revenge, moving society,
moving aggregate bodies just as it moves the individual members
of them. How far is this desire for vengeance to be justified?
Theoretically, as I think, not at all, and if theoretically not at all,
practice ought to conform with theory as far as possible. Unfortunately, however, some portion of this element must, in practice, still continue to exist in every system of pains and penalties.
As long as the multitude, and the men composing it, have passions,
the existence of those passions must be recognized by the legislator;
and those offenses-of which there are always some--which stir
organized society, as they stir the individual, with hatred and a
sense of outrage, must continue not only to be punished, but avenged.
Otherwise, resort will be had by this or that individual to self help;
society will be, pro tanto, disintegrated by the process; dissatisfaction and disaffection will disturb its placid surface, and the confusion and disorder which legislation is instituted to prevent or
allay will be brought about not by theoretical justice, but the practical unwisdom of the lawgiver.
After all is said, however, the passion of revengq is no rational basis, in whole or in part, on which to rest a system of punishment. It never should be admitted as an element, except as a
necessary concession to the brutal instincts and tendencies of men.
Any system founded on reason must omit it, as far as possible, under existing conditions. Now what connection has this element of
revenge, which we recognize as actually existing in every penal
code. with the question of the punishment of the criminally insane?
It has, in my judgment, everything to do with the causes which
have produced our popular and legal notions on the subject. We
are merely called on to comtemplate the reverse of the picture. If
vengeance is the end to be attained by the criminal law, if it is, in
other words, an emotional code, those of us who are demanding a
murderer's blood, for instance, out of passion, feel, if we are fairminded, that we ought not to glut that vengeance on one who is irrational-who knew not what he did. The prisoner therefore is to
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be spared by the operation of that same passion which at one time
clamored for his punishment. This incoherence of view is characteristic of the method, which deals emotionally or sentimentally
with subjects susceptible of being reasoned on.
We ought, therefore, to found our punishments on the true
reason of the right and to punish nothing which does not have 'the
tendency to obstruct the pursuit of society's legitimate objects.
Certainly, society has the right to prevent, if it can, the occurrence of those acts which, if generally acted on, would result in
its own dissolution. No higher right can be claimed for corporate
action than this. If society cannot do this, it can do nothing.
Of such offenses, murder is undoubtedly one. It must be prevented,
if possible; at least it must be minimized. And this must be done
by punishment. The objects of punishment are twofold: "Ut
poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveneat." First, it operates
in respect of the individual, to prevent a repetition by him, at least,
of his offense. Secondly, it operates as a deterrent to others by
way of example or warning.
Now, the punishment for murder has always been and by right
ought to be rigorous. It is*easier, in all things (including murder),
to do a thing the second time than it was to do it first. Remembering this, society does not fulfil its duty to itself and its members
if it allows the possibility of a second murder by the same individual. Capital punishment may or may not be justifiable. It is
the usual penalty in civilized states; and has obviously one great
advantage over all other suggested modes. It effectually accomplishes the first of the -above-named objects: in respect of the individual, no repetition of his act is possible. Of no other conceivable method of punishment can this be said; but as the advocates
of those other modes promise the same certitude, the distinction
is not important here.
II.
But however punished-the sole object of punishment being
the safety of society and its individual members, and the method
adopted being the most efficacious for preventing a recurrence
of his act-let the punishment for murder be meted out to the
murderer, especially, I was going to say, if he is insane. If
a man commits a murder for gain, out of jealousy or of lust, we
can, to a certain extent, prognosticate the probabilities of his
committing another murder. We at least can guess that he will
not repeat his act unless gain is in sight or his passions or ingtincts
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aTe again aroused. In other words, in respect of the sane murderer, he is not motiveless, he is actuated by impulses which we can
understand. But who can predict the waywardness of the insane?
Take an undoubted case, by way of example. A gentleman is mentioned in the books who was under a delusion that his victim's head
was an ostrich egg-perhaps not a very unnatural delusion, after
all-and he cracked it open with an ax, though why he should
have deemed it his duty to crack the ostrich egg, I do not know.
Now, he was insane-which is another way of saying that he will
repeat his experiment when under the influence of the same delusion. If he bad been sane, if his delusion was a mere mistake, I
can understand why he should be acquitted. He is not likely to
make the same mistake again; he may take to studying conchology.
But who can foretell the recurrence of the delusion-who can say
when the dreams of its possessor will not be peopled with ostrich
eggs and eventuate into another nightmare of murder? This illustrates what I mean. Society is never safe with the insane murderer at large. Indeed, it never imagines itself safe except in those
cases where, however it may seek to delude itself on the subject,
it really doubts the insanity. In plain cases of undoubted insanity,
it never hesitates. Take Holmes' case as an example. He murdered some thirty or forty persons, more or less. Was he insane?
If language has any meaning, no one can doubt it. But this, it is
said, is homicidal mania, and this is no excuse for crime. Why
not? Homicide for homicide's sake cannot be permitted. I agree.
But surely one who murders, with no motive but the lust of killing, is as insane, to say the least, as the man who has a definite
motive otherwise, sufficient for himself but not recognized by the
law; and this will be so, as long as we continue to perceive that
the whole is greater than a part.
It may be thought that the punishment of the criminally insane has no tendency to deter others from imitating these offenses;
and, in theory, this may be so. Practically, however, let it be understood that insanity is no defense to murder, and I do not believe that any single pronouncement will go so far to diminish
crimes of that character. This is of course only another way of
saying that I do not believe in the bona fides of the plea of insanity
in the majority of murder cases.
I would, therefore, punish murder with the sole view of protecting society. I would hew to that line, let the chips fall where they
may. I would eschew all ideas of vengeance, whether the passion
i6
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undisguised and rampant, as in the hoarse voice of the multitude
clamoring for blood or dignified or concealed with the refined disguises which are congenial with much current thought. Let us
not try to emulate the Godhead in inflicting punishment on crime
per se; let us not attempt to deal with crime as sin, that is, to
inflict punishment on crime for any other reason than for our own
protection or for the advancement of our own legitimate purposes
here on earth. When analyzed, we shall perceive, that this is only
one of the forms in which passion disguises itself and takes on a
far-resounding nomenclature to conceal an ignoble thing. As such,
it is expressly forbidden to us, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay,
saith the Lord." For punishment on these principles our human
capacities are singularly incapable. When we come to know all the
antecedent facts and surrounding circumstnaces, so far as we can
know them, of any particular crime-we have difficulty in condemning. Every lawyer feels that if he can make a jury understand
how the offense came to be committed and to appreciate the motive which impelled to it, he has gone far on the road to an acquittal. Given the circumstances, says Goethe, and any man can
be conceived as committing any crime. These circumstances in another, the finite mind can never perfectly or adequately know, but
it can perceive enough shrewdly to suspect that Omniscience, unless
it have a superhuman standard, cannot punish at all.
The tenderness with which we regard the, criminally insane
is an extension or survival of the superstitious reverence with which
our barbarian ancestors regarded them. Every primitive people
look upon the idiot with affectionate reverence and on the furious
madman with awe. We are not, however, to continue to be bound
by these amorphous traditions, when our reason assures us that
our sympathy will be misplaced. Insanity may be caused in various ways. It may be caused, for instance, by an accidental blow
on the head or may be the mysterious product of heredity-the
laws of which are so little understood. But neither accident nor
heredity nor causes of the like explain, as an almost universal rule,
the homicidal maniac. A life of gross dissipation, an habitual indulgence in disgusting vices, have "confused the chemic labor of
the blood and tickled the brute brain." This is the "wicked broth"
which explains the insane murderer. Concerning it, one may well
ask, as has beery suggested, whether the insanity thus caused is
not in itself worthy of death rather than an excuse for murder.
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III.
But if we are still to .continue to treat insanity as a defense
to crime, it is important that we ascertain what form and
degree of insanity shall be thus treated. With the countless distinctions with which the medical profession are familiar, I do not
think we are directly concerned. They are of use to those gentlemen in their science and may form the reasons on which they base
their opinions. But it is for their opinions that they are summoned to the witness-box. However the insanity has been caused
or however it is scientifically classified, the question which is important to us is, what shall be the test which shall distinguish the
culpable from the guiltless? Let us begin at the beginning and
admit that no one is completely sane; but between the average man
and the insane murdererthere is an enormous interval. How shall
we bridge over that interval? What shall we give the jury as a
test? It must be admitted, I think, that judges have very often
"darkened counsel" rather than enlightened them by their words on
this subject. There are differences, or shades of differences, in
all the attempts that have been made. The subject cannot be exhaustively considered here; but the test often, if not usually-in
part, at least-relied on, takes its origin from some expressions
used by Lord Chief Justice Tindall in delivering the' answers of
the judges to the questions propounded to them by the Lords in
referenc to McNaghton's killing of Mr. Drummond, whom he mistook for Sir Robert Peel. I say, from some expressions employed,
for I do not think, as I shall state further on, that they ought to
have been torn from the context in which they occur. Those expressions are to the effect that, to find the prisoner responsible, he must
be capable of distinguishing right from wrong and to know that
what he has done is wrong; and to know the nature and quality of
his act.
It is obvious that this test can be applied in such a way as
to convict anyone except a congenital idiot; or in such a way
as to allow a very considerable fish of the malefactor species to
escape from the judicial net: and this would seem, on the surface
of things, to be an objection to it as a working definition. Know
right from wrong! According to what standards? No man commits a crime without what seems to him to be an adequate reason,
a sufficient motive; in other words, a justification for it; and it isfar more rare than is imagined that a criminal ever afterwards
comes to doubt that adequacy, independently of the punishment
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which the law and social usage and the like inflicts upon him.
Take from him his often-heralded remorse, his fear of legal punishment, the terrors of the Church, the panic caused by the rude
histrionism of the "third degree," and I am persuaded you will
find little left. No murderer in a deliberate way ever comes really
to see that what he has done is particularly wrong. According
to his own standard of right and wrong, therefore, he has done
right. But by which of the standards recognized among us is
he to be judged? Right or wrong by the law of God? There is
no law of God that he recognizes. Are we to judge him by the
standard which we recognize? That standard fluctuates according
to our theological and social opinions. Freeman, the Pocasset
murderer, believed that he was ordered by God to immolate his
children and several individuals of the same sect agreed with him.
He was adjudged insane, although he knew the difference between
right and wrong in the. law of God as he understood it, and believed that he was doing right under that law. Do not many of
us believe that a husband has a right under God to avenge his
wife's dishonor in the blood of the adulterer; nay, do not some of
us think that he is dishonored if he omits to do it? And concerning
the nature and quality of his act, how he knows it. Some men have
an acute realization of things and some an obtuse. It is all an
affair of relation. What dullness of sense and memory shall constitute insanity?
Now, suppose we ask ourselves in all this confusion what, after
all, we are trying to do when we try a man for murder? What
law are we vindicating? The answer will go far, if I mistake not,
to blow away these vague and loose phrases which make a pretense of defining which they disappoint and substitute for them
a clear, well-defined and simple test, and one easily applied. We
are trying him not because he has infringed upon the law of Nature
or of Nature's God, nor because he has violated the law of the
church or outraged the morals of the community; but because he
has offended against the positive law of the state. If there is no
positive law, common or statutory, you cannot punish him through
the courts. As this is the reason why he is to be punished, is it
not enough to ascertain that he knew his act came within it and
was'thus forbidden? I believe that, in most cases, a ready and
true answer could be returned to this question. The adoption of
it as a test would go far to dispose of much dubiety. The appeal of Freeman to a higher law; the claim of Thaw that he
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was a self-constituted St. George, would go for nothing-which
I think is their real value. Its adoption would go far, also, in
my judgment, toward composing the traditional hostility between lawyers and doctors on the subject of insanity. The antagonism-like most antagonisms between sensible people-has
had its origin largely in misunderstanding. Questions are asked
the insanity expert without anything except a vague and indeterminate standard of responsibility being placed before him. Thus
left at.large he naturally answers from his own point of view. He
knows that every criminal is deficient mentally or insane-he knows
that abominable wickedness and raving insanity are frequently
one and the same thing; he knows that in the abstract man has
no right to punish at all-and he answers the question out of his
general notions, no one can say incorrectly.
I intimated above that Lord Chief Justice Tindall's language
had not been properly understood. Indeed, I have said nothing
which this celebrated opinion does not justify. When he says right
or wrong, he means right and wrong in law. The fluent language
is limited expressly by him toward the end, to "right and wrong
according to the law of the land." We have, therefore, once been
in the right path, but, misled by a partial reading, we have wandered far astray. Another point discussed by this opinion, directly involved in the Thaw case, is that of insane delusions. The
law on the subject is succinctly and correctly stated. I shall
not exceed the limits of this great authority in what I shall say
hereafter.
IV.
Having discussed the foregoing considerations, let us now see
how the Thaw case was actually managed. It will not of course
be imagined that in what I say I am censuring any particular individual. It is the state of the law and the practice under it that I
think are open to improvement.
The main facts of Thaw's case are indisputable. A young
man, born rich, accustomed to enjoy all that money can control,
naturally induced to believe in its omnipotence, had taken a soiled
dove under his protection and finally had made her his wife. His
victim, White, had been beforehand with him-with what kind and
degree of moral turpitude we need not stop to inquire-but we
will assume that Thaw honestly believed the lady's story to the
effect that White by the aid of drugs had at first committed a
rane upon her, a virgin up to that time, although she admitted
20
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that afterward she had maintained voluntary illicit relations with
him. Admitting the truth of this account-for, in admitting that
Thaw believed it, we, for our purposes, imply its truth-we yet
cannot admit that it justified a homicide in law. If all this were
so, Thaw had no lawful right to kill. Nor do the other circumstances alleged to have entered into his mind, either alone -or in connection with the other facts of the case, give him this right. Those
circumstances, if true, establish that White was a moral monster
and that his dealings with Thaw's wife were not sporadic incidents or accidents in his life, but merely facts of the general scheme
of it. I think we can all agree that a person of this description
is, to use Macduff's expression, "not fit to live." But there is and
can be no doubt that the law does not and cannot recognize Thaw's
right to be the executioner. He was not then married to his
wife and bore to her no relation and owed to her no duty which
the law recognized. Any member of the community could show
as valid a warraiit as he. Moreover,'if White were so monstrously
perverted as is charged, he was clearly as insane as ever Thaw was
when he killed him, and, if I mistake not, in the same way and
'from the same causes.
Assuming, therefore, Thaw to be a free moral agent, by law he
had forfeited his life. The character, or want of character, of his
victim, as above described, certainly abates somewhat the natural
"horror at his taking off." Indeed, on this hypothesis, in one
way-the sentimental way of looking at it-Thaw had done a
service to society. But the courts have no right to be sentimental,
and when they undertake to be so, they do an enormous amount
of injustice alternately to the public and its victims. No one who
has grasped the fundamental notion involved in the very definition
of law, that it is general, can doubt that its nature forbids particular individuals from engrafting exceptions on it.
, How then is the case so to be dealt with that society's paramount interest in the supremacy of the law can be vindicated and
yet ,that the particular circumstances, assuming Thaw's good
faith, may operate in extenuation or mitigation of his offense, so
far as they ought, in his favor? Theoretically, I have no hesitation in saying-by his conviction by the courts of law and by the
well-considered and well-conditioned exercise, if thought fit, of
executive clemency. Practically; however, I admit that there is
another way, not expressly legalized, that I know of, but undoubtedly implicated in the very constitution' of our trials. Without
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troubling themselves, perhaps, to give a logical reason for their
action, perhaps conscious of their inability to do so, juries do, in
every man's experience, exercise the actual, if unjustifiable, power
which they possess and mitigate the rigors of the law by refusing
to convict. There is this to be said in respect of their right: that.
after all, they are to exercise a final responsibility. This responsibility in the clearest and most flagrant cases they always exercise
with reluctance, and often, in other cases, as it seems to me, with
reprehensible cowardice decline to exercise at all.
In the midst of the first trial, on the suggestion of the district
attorney, the court appointed a commission of experts to determine
whether the prisoner was then sane. The common law has always
forbidden the trial as well as the conviction of an insane person;
and most states, including New York, have enacted declaratory statutes on the subject. The question on such a suggestion is not, of
course, whether the prisoner was insane at the time he committed
the act charged against him, but whether he is. insane at the time
of the trial, and there is no necessary connection, in the eye of the
law, between the two periods. In other words, in law as well as in
fact, the insanity may have come upon the prisoner since the alleged
crime, or it may be a continuance of the same phase.
Admitting the law to be as I have stated, it was one of the misfortunes attending this ill-starred case that the application should
have been made at the time it was. The commission, sitting pending
the trial, composed of specialists, make up their report that Thaw
is sane-that is, sane at the time of the trial, not necessarily sane
when he committed the homicide. But the distinction in this case
goes for little. That a man can be sane one minute before his crime
and sane one minute after it, and insane at the moment of its perpetration, has been, indeed, in judicial annals, -more than once
declared; and this is manifestly the theory-admitting that it has
coherence-upon which Thaw's application for release has been
founded. Such a position ought, however, to be scrutinized closely.
The commission thus sitting is more or less in a hurry while the
main trial is awaiting the termination of their labors, and must have
felt a temptation to deal with theit duties perfunctorily. However
arrived at, it reports that Thaw is sane. The trial proceeds. Now,
suppose he had been convicted? Would not, the appellate tribunal,
sitting to revise this finding, feel that, perhaps, Thaw would have
been acquitted on the ground of insanity if it had not been, not for
this evidence (for the evidence on which the report was made was
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not produced), but for this judgment of learned men on the subject?
The effect of authority in matters of opinion differs in different
individuals. There are some men of independent minds who seem
to pay little or no heed to it; but the vast majority of men are, I
think, simply overwhelmed by it. Practically, in this case, the jury
would have been told that if they found Thaw insane, they differed
from this body of high authority on the subject. If this would not
have operated to reverse such a verdict, it would have been felt by
all to be what I have called it-an unfortunate occurrence as it was
managed.
At this first trial, though the law was plain, the astute counsel
for the defense endeavored to free Thaw by an appeal to those general circumstances, manifestly immaterial as against the plain rule
but cogent when addressed to the pardoning power which, as I have
said, the jury actually possesses and sometimes rightly or wrongly
exercises. In this they were greatly assisted by the absurd rules of
evidence that the presiding judge felt bound by, which resulted in
admitting a mass of testimony wholly irrelevant to the issue to be'
determined, but of enormous influence looked at as appeals to .mitigate the rigor of the rule. Indeed, one might have asked himself
whether he were in the presence of a tribunal governed by the common law and was not rather in attendance on a French trial where
"the wind bloweth where it listeth." The temptation which the situation furnished could scarcely fail to be taken advantage of by the
defense. In fact, it was counsel's clear moral duty to take a fair
chance for a clear verdict of acquittal, and a fair chance it was.
Indeed, if it had not been for the astonishing display of vigor and
acumen on the part of the district attorney-I say astonishing even
to those accustomed to witness the displays of the extraordinary, if
irregular, capacity of this remarkable man-it looks to me as though
the attempt would have succeeded. The dramatic exhibition of the
wife-seeking to withdraw to her own narrow shoulders the responsibility from her husband at any expense of womanly modesty and
womanly shame-on the moment, to use the affectation of Addison's
day, "captured the town." All of us would have acquitted her while
under the spell of the occasion. Unemotional, indeed, must that
man have been who could listen to the sad and sordid tale without
his heart's becoming more or less liquid; who could contemplate
unmoved the spectacle of this pathetic, fragile creature, standing
in the crash of tragic circumstance, to which her little existence, her
brief "pilgrimage of life" had thus far conducted. In the pyro23
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technics of the courtroom we could all see fitfully this last product,
this last victim of the Fates: the neglected childhood, the necessitous
youth, not surrounded by the common safeguards which civilization
is wont to cast around her. daughters, her "madness of superfluous
health," yearning as youth and health must ever yearn, for pleasure,
misnamed ha.ppiness, her "fatal gift of beauty" alluring, and a certain playfulness and gracefulness of mind retaining the affections
of men who, perhaps, meant her not altogether ill. In fine, we could
all see and realize how every step had prepared for the next and
how an inexorable fate, without conscious realization on her part,
had resulted in this tempestuous explosion of brutal passion. She
had been the mouse, the little ridiculus mus, who had heedlessly,
almost joyfully, gnawed the net and released these lions of lust and
jealousy, of revenge and of murder. Oh, we could all say something
for her. But she was not on trial. The arguments brought out all
the weakness of the case and enabled some of us to see how near we
had been to making a mistake. The stage had been well set, the
accessories skilfully combined, the principal performer had played
admirably, but when it came to the argument the counsel who had
done so well found himself paralyzed. The appeal had been to the
emotions and he felt how powerless he was to state the case in terms
of reason addressed to the intellect. The panic-stricken prisoner
could produce a murder out of the delirious ingredients; but the
husband who, in his wife's name and for her honor's sake, had fired
the shot, showed by the exhibition he had allowed or coerced her to
.make, how little of genuine manliness there was in him. He was a
poor subject for his counsel's panegyric. It was a much bespotted,
strangely bedraggled St. George who had emerged from his controversy with the dragons. And the best that his counsel could do
was to escape in a cloud of words. But there was no complete failure; there was no disaster; and another trial was necessitated.
It was determined at the second trial not to attempt to repeat
the experiment. It had been fairly tried, but it had failed. The
known belief of the district attorney that Thaw was insane made
the second trial almost a stipulated result. He was acquitted on
the ground of his insanity. But on what evidence? On substantially the same evidence as that given at the first trial, only a different effect was sought to be given to it. Considering that the
first trial had practically settled that the facts of Thaw's defense
'respecting White and others were true had failed to secure -his
acquittal; the second trial proceeded on the theory that they were
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not only false, but so false as to indicate that a man who could
believe in them was insane; and Thaw escaped with his life. Now, I
call this an extraordinary result. If a man has certain beliefs and
they are such as a normal man can believe, indeed if they be founded
on truth, he has nevertheless no right to take the life of the man
to whom they relate; but if these same beliefs are figments of the
imagination, if they are delusions, he has that right; at least he
is not to be punished if he acts on it. I do not admire this state of
the law. If it does not show that the law is "a ass, a idiot," it cannot be rated higher than "Crowner's quest law." If a man has actually cheated me out of $10,000, I cannot, with impunity, take his
life. But if he hasn't and doesn't owe me a cent and I am under a
delusion that he has and does, I can.
I am aware that the question may be said not to be this and
that the complete statement of the case is that the fact one entertains these delusions, though the delusions themselves are no defense,
is a fact from which one can infer mental unsoundness. In respect
of some delusions, this may be so; but when we consider that Thaw's
act is constantly being perpetrated by sexually mad and jealous
persons who are not legally insane, how far are we to carry our conjectures? What point must mental unsoundness reach in order to
justify murder? Let it be admitted never so much, that Thaw's wife
was, long before she married or even knew him, violated by White;
that everything in her character which subsequently shocked Thaw
is attributable to that circumstance; that White had similarly violated all the daughters of the Tenderloin, nay, that he is responsible
for the existence of prostitution in the city of New York; that Harry
Thaw looked on the perpetrator of these enormities as St. George
looked on the dragons of his mythical time, with the same disgust,
the same loathing, the same horror-still, I say, the existing law
of the state of New York did not justify him in taking White's life.
How, then, is the case altered by considering all this to be false,
which nevertheless he believed to be true-no matter how incredible
it all is, no matter how deluded he must be, unless you go farther
and give evidence of mental unsoundness transcending anything to
be implied from it? This evidence was, I suppose, intended to be
supplied by the experts. But their testimony was all implicated in
those delusions and evolutions out of them. The experts do not
make it clear whether Thaw is to be considered insane because he
believed in these delusions or because he acted on them-a point of
enormous importance to Mr. Anthony Comstock-for whether he
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is a paranoiac or not seems to turn on the distinction. They said
he had an "exaggerated ego." Now, every man has an ego, and it
is only out of complaisance to the human race, or when speaking
relatively, that we do not assert that every man has an exaggerated
ego. It is the ego which constitutes the individual; it is the insistence on the ego which serves as his contribution to any share of
success he may have-I say contributes, for it is a shallow philosophy which will suppose it the whole or even the chief ingredient of
the whole. As long as the ego is wrapped up in one's self-consciousness it is sufficiently large, it is sufficiently "exaggerated." Nor does
it become diminished by one's own reflections concerning it. Only
when it shall have issued into outward fact, eventuated in outward
endeavor, do the attrition of experience and the reception it has
met with in the world reduce it to something like its proper dimensions. As long as by its conformity with the spirit of the age it
develops into accomplishment, it cannot be considered exaggerated,
however huge the bulk of it. But when, for want of this conformity,
the difference between its promises and its accomplishments becomes
observable, we call its possessor "a conceited ass" and the like; and
when the 'difference is excessive we say that he is a fool, if it is
also grotesque and insane, if it develops into crime. An ego which
has fallen on evil times leads one born to kingship to assume the r~le
of opera director or to occupy the pulpit; and of one successful in
the devious ways of politics, to undertake the correction of current
orthography and to degenerate into Omniscience.
This brief account of the natural history of the ego prepares
us not to be astonished when we learn that, as an indication of insanity, an exaggerated ego, looking at it alone and. sequestrated from
other considerations, is of nearly worthless value. Your man of
genius possesses it; so also does every fool. Full-blown specimens can
be seen on the boards of any theater in this town every night. Your
artist in the fine and sensuous arts almost always exhibits it. What
is more to our immediate purpose, no great criminal, however sane
he-is admitted to be, ever existed who did not own and flagrantly
flaunt, if need be on the scaffold, an enormously exaggerated ego.
When we are asked to classify the possessors of the inflated ego we
must ask further questions. And if we find that they have a proclivity to crime we may class them as criminal, but not necessarily as
insane.
As the exaggerated ego is a deduction from the circumstances
of the crime, so the other symptoms mentioned are deductions from
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that ego. They say Thaw's belief that he can try or direct his own
case better than his counsel shows him to be insane. I see nothing
in it except what is to be expected of an undisciplined youth who
has been in the habit of having his own way. But in sober earnest-ness I ask if a lawyer ever practiced whose clients, as a whole, did
not consistently believe this? Just as he thinks he can try cases, so
he sets up to be a literary light and an inordinate desire to write
for review or magazine is a sure sign of the paranoiac, say the doctors. In the name of our idolatry, let us pray that this is not so, if
we get a dollar a line for it. But all these symptoms mentioned by
the experts are simply consequences flowing from the exaggerated
ego, and as such are equally applicable to whole classes who are not
insane, and eminently characteristic of the entire criminal world. I
am not, however, quarreling with the doctors. Thaw is insane, I
agree; but he is insane in the sense in which any abominably wicked
person is insane.
.v.
But this is not, as we all know, the end of the Thaw case.
Having asserted, at the first trial, that the facts testified to concerning White were true and showed that he deserved death; at the
second, that they were false, but that he was under the delusion that
they were true-within eleven months of his commitment he petitions
for his liberation that, whether true or false, he was never under a
delusion concerning them. If the case heard before Judge Mills had
been presented to either of the tribunals which tried him, Thaw must
have been sentenced to be hanged. And I wish humbly to state that
a condition of the law or the practice under it which permits this
playing with a case, as though it-were a shuttlecock, is a travesty
on justice. A writ of habeas cannot, indeed, be made to perform
the office of an appeal or writ of error, and Judge Mills was certainly right when he treated the verdict and judgment of the trial
as rei adjudicata. No court can impute anything against the verity
of that finding. But the question as to whether Thaw has since
that adjudication recovered his wits may be an exceedingly embarrassing one if addressed to a judge who may think that, in a legal
sense importing immunity from punishment, he had never lost them.
In England an acquittal of a murderer on the ground of insanity results in his incarceration at the pleasure of the Crown. After
such an acquittal there should be no appeal to a court of law for
his liberation, but only to the source of executive clemency. Courts
are not constituted to deal with the complications of such a situa-
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tion. After the jury at the trial has found the prisoner insane, a
judge is asked to find him sane. The inquiry is not, indeed, confined to the same period of time, and it is of course conceivable that
.an insane person may become sane, though the burden of proving
this change ought, in my judgment, to rest heavily upon him; but
where, as here, the assertion practically is that not only is he sane
now, but was sane then-and the evidence is addressed with equal
propriety to both periods-I think the court ought to take the
position that it is essentially asked to set aside a verdict peculiarly
within the province of a jury to return and to refuse to exercise
its power to do this. It follows also that the hearing ought to be
confined to this fact of recovery and the evidence excluded which
does not bear upon it. But, supposing the court, on whatever considerations, comes to the conclusion that the prisoner is sane now,
but believes also that he was sane then-in other words, feels obliged
to release him from the effect of the verdict of insanity, but would
also like to discharge that part of the verdict which acquitted-he
*is as a man, if not as a magistrate, in a very unsatisfactor dilemma.
Out of this dilemma he has no power to escape, and so the law ought
not to place him in it.
And this last phase of the matter is of more than ordinary
significance when we consider how verdicts of this sort are made up.
In nine out of ten cases, dread of responsibility explains them. Juries
do not believe the man guiltless, but they shrink from shedding his
blood. On the other hand, they do not dare to release him. The
result is a compromise by which the responsibility is evaded and the
safety of society, as is hoped, secured. Both objects might be accomplished if the matter were left to the pardoning power of the
state. The governor can exercise a discretion which it might be
improper for a judge to confmplate; and he can refuse a release
from the insane asylum if, by granting it, he thinks he will let loose
a criminal. An objection to this course that it would be unconstitutional has met with approval in some jurisdictions. I think, however, an unobjectionable but efficacious measure of the sort can be
framed. If this cannot be, let us at least bear in mind that a person
acquitted of murder on the ground of insanity is not only insane
but criminally insane; and, let us so frame the verdict of acquittal
and the judgment thereon as to make it a complete and final and
coriclusive return to any writ of habeas sued out for his freedom.

